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Abstract—Deep learning has been successfully applied to solve
various complex problems ranging from big data analytics to
computer vision and human-level control. Deep learning advances
however have also been employed to create software that can
cause threats to privacy, democracy and national security. One
of those deep learning-powered applications recently emerged
is “deepfake”. Deepfake algorithms can create fake images and
videos that humans cannot distinguish them from authentic
ones. The proposal of technologies that can automatically detect
and assess the integrity of digital visual media is therefore
indispensable. This paper presents a survey of algorithms used
to create deepfakes and, more importantly, methods proposed to
detect deepfakes in the literature to date. We present extensive
discussions on challenges, research trends and directions related
to deepfake technologies. By reviewing the background of deep-
fakes and state-of-the-art deepfake detection methods, this study
provides a comprehensive overview of deepfake techniques and
facilitates the development of new and more robust methods to
deal with the increasingly challenging deepfakes.
Index Terms—survey, review, deepfakes, artificial intelligence,
deep learning, computer vision, autoencoders, forensics, GAN,
generative adversarial networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deepfake (stemming from “deep learning” and “fake”) is
a technique that can superimpose face images of a target
person to a video of a source person to create a video of
the target person doing or saying things the source person
does. The underlying mechanism for deepfake creation is
deep learning models such as autoencoders and generative
adversarial networks, which have been applied widely in the
computer vision domain [1]–[7]. These models are used to
examine facial expressions and movements of a person and
synthesize facial images of another person making analogous
expressions and movements [8]. Deepfake methods normally
require a large amount of image and video data to train models
to create photo-realistic images and videos. As public figures
such as celebrities and politicians may have a large number of
videos and images available online, they are initial targets of
deepfakes. Deepfakes were used to swap faces of celebrities
or politicians to bodies in porn images and videos. The first
deepfake video emerged in 2017 where face of a celebrity
was swapped to face of a porn actor. It is threatening to world
security when deepfake methods can be employed to create
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videos of world leaders with fake speeches for falsification
purposes [9], [10]. Deepfakes therefore can be abused to cause
political or religion tensions between countries, to fool public
and affect results in election campaigns, or create chaos in
financial markets by creating fake news [11]. It can be even
used to generate fake satellite images of the Earth to contain
objects that do not really exist to confuse military analysts,
e.g., creating a fake bridge across a river although there is no
such a bridge in reality. This can mislead a troop who have
been guided to cross the bridge in a battle [12], [13].
There is also positive use of deepfakes such as creating
voices of those who have lost theirs or updating episodes of
movies without reshooting them [14]. However, the number
of malicious uses of deepfakes largely dominates that of the
positive ones. The development of advanced deep networks
and the availability of large amount of data have made the
forged images and videos almost indistinguishable to humans
and even to sophisticated computer algorithms. The process
of creating those manipulated images and videos is also much
simpler today as it needs as little as an identity photo or
a short video of a target individual. Less and less effort is
required to produce a stunningly convincing tempered footage.
Recent advances can even create a deepfake with just a still
image [15]. Deepfakes therefore can be a threat affecting not
only public figures but also ordinary people. For example, a
voice deepfake was used to scam a CEO out of $243,000
[16]. A recent release of a software called DeepNude shows
more disturbing threats as it can transform a person to a non-
consensual porn [17]. Likewise, the Chinese app Zao has gone
viral lately as less-skilled users can swap their faces onto
bodies of movie stars and insert themselves into well-known
movies and TV clips [18]. These forms of falsification create
a huge threat to violation of privacy and identity, and affect
many aspects of human lives.
Finding the truth in digital domain therefore has become
increasingly critical. It is even more challenging when dealing
with deepfakes as they are majorly used to serve malicious
purposes and almost anyone can create deepfakes these days
using existing deepfake tools. Thus far, there have been
numerous methods proposed to detect deepfakes [19]–[23].
Most of them are based on deep learning, and thus a bat-
tle between malicious and positive uses of deep learning
methods has been arising. To address the threat of face-
swapping technology or deepfakes, the United States Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) initiated a
research scheme in media forensics (named Media Forensics
or MediFor) to accelerate the development of fake digital
visual media detection methods [24]. Recently, Facebook Inc.
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2teaming up with Microsoft Corp and the Partnership on AI
coalition have launched the Deepfake Detection Challenge
to catalyse more research and development in detecting and
preventing deepfakes from being used to mislead viewers [25].
Data obtained from https://app.dimensions.ai at the end of July
2020 show that the number of deepfake papers has increased
significantly in recent years (Fig. 1). Although the obtained
numbers of deepfake papers may be lower than actual numbers
but the research trend of this topic is obviously increasing.
Fig. 1. Number of papers related to deepfakes in years from 2015 to 2020,
obtained from https://app.dimensions.ai on 24 July 2020 with the search
keyword “deepfake” applied to full text of scholarly papers. The number
of such papers in 2018 and 2019 are 60 and 309, respectively. From the
beginning of 2020 to near the end of July 2020, there are 414 papers about
deepfakes and we linearly estimate that this number will be rising to more
than 730 until the end of 2020.
This paper presents a survey of methods for creating as well
as detecting deepfakes. In Section II, we present the principles
of deepfake algorithms and how deep learning has been used
to enable such disruptive technologies. Section III reviews
different methods for detecting deepfakes as well as their
advantages and disadvantages. We discuss challenges, research
trends and directions on deepfake detection and multimedia
forensics problems in Section IV.
II. DEEPFAKE CREATION
Deepfakes have become popular due to the quality of
tampered videos and also the easy-to-use ability of their appli-
cations to a wide range of users with various computer skills
from professional to novice. These applications are mostly
developed based on deep learning techniques. Deep learning
is well known for its capability of representing complex and
high-dimensional data. One variant of the deep networks with
that capability is deep autoencoders, which have been widely
applied for dimensionality reduction and image compression
[26]–[28]. The first attempt of deepfake creation was FakeApp,
developed by a Reddit user using autoencoder-decoder pairing
structure [29], [30]. In that method, the autoencoder extracts
latent features of face images and the decoder is used to
reconstruct the face images. To swap faces between source
images and target images, there is a need of two encoder-
decoder pairs where each pair is used to train on an image
set, and the encoder’s parameters are shared between two
network pairs. In other words, two pairs have the same encoder
network. This strategy enables the common encoder to find and
learn the similarity between two sets of face images, which are
relatively unchallenging because faces normally have similar
features such as eyes, nose, mouth positions. Fig. 2 shows a
deepfake creation process where the feature set of face A is
connected with the decoder B to reconstruct face B from the
original face A. This approach is applied in several works such
as DeepFaceLab [31], DFaker [32], DeepFake tf (tensorflow-
based deepfakes) [33].
Fig. 2. A deepfake creation model using two encoder-decoder pairs. Two
networks use the same encoder but different decoders for training process
(top). An image of face A is encoded with the common encoder and decoded
with decoder B to create a deepfake (bottom).
By adding adversarial loss and perceptual loss implemented
in VGGFace [34] to the encoder-decoder architecture, an
improved version of deepfakes based on the generative adver-
sarial network (GAN) [35], i.e. faceswap-GAN, was proposed
in [36]. The VGGFace perceptual loss is added to make eye
movements to be more realistic and consistent with input faces
and help to smooth out artifacts in segmentation mask, leading
to higher quality output videos. This model facilitates the
creation of outputs with 64x64, 128x128, and 256x256 resolu-
tions. In addition, the multi-task convolutional neural network
(CNN) from the FaceNet implementation [37] is introduced
to make face detection more stable and face alignment more
reliable. The CycleGAN [38] is utilized for generative network
implementation. Popular deepfake tools and their features are
summarized in Table I.
III. DEEPFAKE DETECTION
Deepfakes are increasingly detrimental to privacy, society
security and democracy [43]. Methods for detecting deepfakes
have been proposed as soon as this threat was introduced.
Early attempts were based on handcrafted features obtained
from artifacts and inconsistencies of the fake video synthesis
process. Recent methods, on the other hand, applied deep
learning to automatically extract salient and discriminative
features to detect deepfakes [44], [45].
Deepfake detection is normally deemed a binary classifi-
cation problem where classifiers are used to classify between
authentic videos and tampered ones. This kind of methods
3TABLE I
SUMMARY OF NOTABLE DEEPFAKE TOOLS
Tools Links Key Features
Faceswap https://github.com/deepfakes/faceswap - Using two encoder-decoder pairs.
- Parameters of the encoder are shared.
Faceswap-GAN https://github.com/shaoanlu/faceswap-GAN Adversarial loss and perceptual loss (VGGface) are added to an auto-encoder architec-
ture.
Few-Shot Face
Translation GAN
https://github.com/shaoanlu/fewshot-face-translation-GAN - Use a pre-trained face recognition model to extract latent embeddings for GAN
processing.
- Incorporate semantic priors obtained by modules from FUNIT [39] and SPADE [40].
DeepFaceLab https://github.com/iperov/DeepFaceLab - Expand from the Faceswap method with new models, e.g. H64, H128, LIAEF128,
SAE [41].
- Support multiple face extraction modes, e.g. S3FD, MTCNN, dlib, or manual [41].
DFaker https://github.com/dfaker/df - DSSIM loss function [42] is used to reconstruct face.
- Implemented based on Keras library.
DeepFake tf https://github.com/StromWine/DeepFake tf Similar to DFaker but implemented based on tensorflow.
Deepfakes web β https://deepfakesweb.com/ Commercial website for face swapping using deep learning algorithms.
Fig. 3. Categories of reviewed papers relevant to deepfake detection methods
where we divide papers into two major groups, i.e. fake image detection and
face video detection.
requires a large database of real and fake videos to train clas-
sification models. The number of fake videos is increasingly
available, but it is still limited in terms of setting a benchmark
for validating various detection methods. To address this issue,
Korshunov and Marcel [46] produced a notable deepfake
data set consisting of 620 videos based on the GAN model
using the open source code Faceswap-GAN [36]. Videos from
the publicly available VidTIMIT database [47] were used to
generate low and high quality deepfake videos, which can
effectively mimic the facial expressions, mouth movements,
and eye blinking. These videos were then used to test various
deepfake detection methods. Test results show that the popular
face recognition systems based on VGG [48] and Facenet [37],
[49] are unable to detect deepfakes effectively. Other methods
such as lip-syncing approaches [50]–[52] and image quality
metrics with support vector machine (SVM) [53], [54] produce
very high error rate when applied to detect deepfake videos
from this newly produced data set. This raises concerns about
the critical need of future development of more robust methods
that can detect deepfakes from genuine.
This section presents a survey of deepfake detection meth-
ods where we group them into two major categories: fake
image detection methods and fake video detection ones (see
Fig. 3). The latter is distinguished into two groups: visual ar-
tifacts within single video frame-based methods and temporal
features across frames-based ones. Whilst most of the meth-
ods based on temporal features use deep learning recurrent
classification models, the methods use visual artifacts within
video frame can be implemented by either deep or shallow
classifiers.
A. Fake Image Detection
Face swapping has a number of compelling applications in
video compositing, transfiguration in portraits, and especially
in identity protection as it can replace faces in photographs
by ones from a collection of stock images. However, it is also
one of the techniques that cyber attackers employ to penetrate
identification or authentication systems to gain illegitimate
access. The use of deep learning such as CNN and GAN
has made swapped face images more challenging for forensics
models as it can preserve pose, facial expression and lighting
of the photographs [55]. Zhang et al. [56] used the bag of
words method to extract a set of compact features and fed it
into various classifiers such as SVM [57], random forest (RF)
[58] and multi-layer perceptrons (MLP) [59] for discriminating
swapped face images from the genuine. Among deep learning-
generated images, those synthesised by GAN models are
probably most difficult to detect as they are realistic and high-
quality based on GAN’s capability to learn distribution of the
complex input data and generate new outputs with similar
input distribution.
Most works on detection of GAN generated images however
do not consider the generalization capability of the detection
models although the development of GAN is ongoing, and
many new extensions of GAN are frequently introduced. Xuan
et al. [60] used an image preprocessing step, e.g. Gaussian
blur and Gaussian noise, to remove low level high frequency
clues of GAN images. This increases the pixel level statistical
similarity between real images and fake images and requires
the forensic classifier to learn more intrinsic and meaningful
features, which has better generalization capability than previ-
ous image forensics methods [61], [62] or image steganalysis
networks [63].
On the other hand, Agarwal and Varshney [64] cast the
GAN-based deepfake detection as a hypothesis testing prob-
lem where a statistical framework was introduced using the
information-theoretic study of authentication [65]. The mini-
mum distance between distributions of legitimate images and
images generated by a particular GAN is defined, namely
the oracle error. The analytic results show that this distance
4increases when the GAN is less accurate, and in this case, it
is easier to detect deepfakes. In case of high-resolution image
inputs, an extremely accurate GAN is required to generate fake
images that are hard to detect.
Recently, Hsu et al. [66] introduced a two-phase deep learn-
ing method for detection of deepfake images. The first phase is
a feature extractor based on the common fake feature network
(CFFN) where the Siamese network architecture presented in
[67] is used. The CFFN encompasses several dense units with
each unit including different numbers of dense blocks [68]
to improve the representative capability for the fake images.
The number of dense units is three or five depending on the
validation data being face or general images, and the number
of channels in each unit is varied up to a few hundreds.
Discriminative features between the fake and real images, i.e.
pairwise information, are extracted through CFFN learning
process. These features are then fed into the second phase,
which is a small CNN concatenated to the last convolutional
layer of CFFN to distinguish deceptive images from genuine.
The proposed method is validated for both fake face and fake
general image detection. On the one hand, the face data set is
obtained from CelebA [69], containing 10,177 identities and
202,599 aligned face images of various poses and background
clutter. Five GAN variants are used to generate fake images
with size of 64x64, including deep convolutional GAN (DC-
GAN) [70], Wasserstein GAN (WGAN) [71], WGAN with
gradient penalty (WGAN-GP) [72], least squares GAN [73],
and progressive growth of GAN (PGGAN) [74]. A total of
385,198 training images and 10,000 test images of both real
and fake ones are obtained for validating the proposed method.
On the other hand, the general data set is extracted from the
ILSVRC12 [75]. The large scale GAN training model for high
fidelity natural image synthesis (BIGGAN) [76], self-attention
GAN [77] and spectral normalization GAN [78] are used to
generate fake images with size of 128x128. The training set
consists of 600,000 fake and real images whilst the test set
includes 10,000 images of both types. Experimental results
show the superior performance of the proposed method against
its competing methods such as those introduced in [79]–[82].
B. Fake Video Detection
Most image detection methods cannot be used for videos
because of the strong degradation of the frame data after
video compression [83]. Furthermore, videos have temporal
characteristics that are varied among sets of frames and thus
challenging for methods designed to detect only still fake
images. This subsection focuses on deepfake video detection
methods and categorizes them into two groups: methods that
employ temporal features and those that explore visual artifacts
within frames.
1) Temporal Features across Video Frames: Based on the
observation that temporal coherence is not enforced effec-
tively in the synthesis process of deepfakes, Sabir et al. [84]
leveraged the use of spatio-temporal features of video streams
to detect deepfakes. Video manipulation is carried out on a
frame-by-frame basis so that low level artifacts produced by
face manipulations are believed to further manifest themselves
as temporal artifacts with inconsistencies across frames. A
recurrent convolutional model (RCN) was proposed based on
the integration of the convolutional network DenseNet [68]
and the gated recurrent unit cells [85] to exploit temporal
discrepancies across frames (see Fig. 4). The proposed method
is tested on the FaceForensics++ data set, which includes 1,000
videos [86], and shows promising results.
Fig. 4. A two-step process for face manipulation detection where the
preprocessing step aims to detect, crop and align faces on a sequence of frames
and the second step distinguishes manipulated and authentic face images by
combining convolutional neural network (CNN) and recurrent neural network
(RNN) [84].
Likewise, Guera and Delp [87] highlighted that deepfake
videos contain intra-frame inconsistencies and temporal incon-
sistencies between frames. They then proposed the temporal-
aware pipeline method that uses CNN and long short term
memory (LSTM) to detect deepfake videos. CNN is employed
to extract frame-level features, which are then fed into the
LSTM to create a temporal sequence descriptor. A fully-
connected network is finally used for classifying doctored
videos from real ones based on the sequence descriptor as
illustrated in Fig. 5.
Fig. 5. A deepfake detection method using convolutional neural network
(CNN) and long short term memory (LSTM) to extract temporal features of a
given video sequence, which are represented via the sequence descriptor. The
detection network consisting of fully-connected layers is employed to take the
sequence descriptor as input and calculate probabilities of the frame sequence
belonging to either authentic or deepfake class [87].
On the other hand, the use of a physiological signal, eye
blinking, to detect deepfakes was proposed in [88] based
on the observation that a person in deepfakes has a lot less
frequent blinking than that in untampered videos. A healthy
adult human would normally blink somewhere between 2 to
10 seconds, and each blink would take 0.1 and 0.4 seconds.
Deepfake algorithms, however, often use face images available
online for training, which normally show people with open
eyes, i.e. very few images published on the internet show
people with closed eyes. Thus, without having access to
images of people blinking, deepfake algorithms do not have
the capability to generate fake faces that can blink normally.
In other words, blinking rates in deepfakes are much lower
than those in normal videos. To discriminate real and fake
videos, Li et al. [88] first decompose the videos into frames
where face regions and then eye areas are extracted based
on six eye landmarks. After few steps of pre-processing such
as aligning faces, extracting and scaling the bounding boxes
5of eye landmark points to create new sequences of frames,
these cropped eye area sequences are distributed into long-term
recurrent convolutional networks (LRCN) [89] for dynamic
state prediction. The LRCN consists of a feature extractor
based on CNN, a sequence learning based on long short term
memory (LSTM), and a state prediction based on a fully
connected layer to predict probability of eye open and close
state. The eye blinking shows strong temporal dependencies
and thus the implementation of LSTM helps to capture these
temporal patterns effectively. The blinking rate is calculated
based on the prediction results where a blink is defined as
a peak above the threshold of 0.5 with duration less than 7
frames. This method is evaluated on a data set collected from
the web consisting of 49 interview and presentation videos
and their corresponding fake videos generated by the deep-
fake algorithms. The experimental results indicate promising
performance of the proposed method in detecting fake videos,
which can be further improved by considering dynamic pattern
of blinking, e.g. highly frequent blinking may also be a sign
of tampering.
2) Visual Artifacts within Video Frame: As can be noticed
in the previous subsection, the methods using temporal pat-
terns across video frames are mostly based on deep recurrent
network models to detect deepfake videos. This subsection
investigates the other approach that normally decomposes
videos into frames and explores visual artifacts within single
frames to obtain discriminant features. These features are
then distributed into either a deep or shallow classifier to
differentiate between fake and authentic videos. We thus group
methods in this subsection based on the types of classifiers,
i.e. either deep or shallow.
a) Deep classifiers: Deepfake videos are normally cre-
ated with limited resolutions, which require an affine face
warping approach (i.e., scaling, rotation and shearing) to
match the configuration of the original ones. Because of the
resolution inconsistency between the warped face area and the
surrounding context, this process leaves artifacts that can be
detected by CNN models such as VGG16 [90], ResNet50,
ResNet101 and ResNet152 [91]. A deep learning method to
detect deepfakes based on the artifacts observed during the
face warping step of the deepfake generation algorithms was
proposed in [92]. The proposed method is evaluated on two
deepfake data sets, namely the UADFV and DeepfakeTIMIT.
The UADFV data set [93] contains 49 real videos and 49 fake
videos with 32,752 frames in total. The DeepfakeTIMIT data
set [52] includes a set of low quality videos of 64 x 64 size and
another set of high quality videos of 128 x 128 with totally
10,537 pristine images and 34,023 fabricated images extracted
from 320 videos for each quality set. Performance of the
proposed method is compared with other prevalent methods
such as two deepfake detection MesoNet methods, i.e. Meso-
4 and MesoInception-4 [83], HeadPose [93], and the face
tampering detection method two-stream NN [94]. Advantage
of the proposed method is that it needs not to generate
deepfake videos as negative examples before training the
detection models. Instead, the negative examples are generated
dynamically by extracting the face region of the original image
and aligning it into multiple scales before applying Gaussian
blur to a scaled image of random pick and warping back to
the original image. This reduces a large amount of time and
computational resources compared to other methods, which
require deepfakes are generated in advance.
Recently, Nguyen et al. [95] proposed the use of capsule
networks for detecting manipulated images and videos. The
capsule network was initially proposed to address limitations
of CNNs when applied to inverse graphics tasks, which
aim to find physical processes used to produce images of
the world [96]. The recent development of capsule network
based on dynamic routing algorithm [97] demonstrates its
ability to describe the hierarchical pose relationships between
object parts. This development is employed as a component
in a pipeline for detecting fabricated images and videos as
illustrated in Fig. 6. A dynamic routing algorithm is deployed
to route the outputs of the three capsules to the output capsules
through a number of iterations to separate between fake and
real images. The method is evaluated through four data sets
covering a wide range of forged image and video attacks. They
include the well-known Idiap Research Institute replay-attack
data set [98], the deepfake face swapping data set created
by Afchar et al. [83], the facial reenactment FaceForensics
data set [99], produced by the Face2Face method [100], and
the fully computer-generated image data set generated by
Rahmouni et al. [101]. The proposed method yields the best
performance compared to its competing methods in all of these
data sets. This shows the potential of the capsule network in
building a general detection system that can work effectively
for various forged image and video attacks.
Fig. 6. Capsule network takes features obtained from the VGG-19 network
[90] to distinguish fake images or videos from the real ones (top). The pre-
processing step detects face region and scales it to the size of 128x128 before
VGG-19 is used to extract latent features for the capsule network, which
comprises three primary capsules and two output capsules, one for real and
one for fake images (bottom). The statistical pooling constitutes an important
part of capsule network that deals with forgery detection [95].
b) Shallow classifiers: Deepfake detection methods
mostly rely on the artifacts or inconsistency of intrinsic
features between fake and real images or videos. Yang et al.
[93] proposed a detection method by observing the differences
between 3D head poses comprising head orientation and
position, which are estimated based on 68 facial landmarks
of the central face region. The 3D head poses are examined
because there is a shortcoming in the deepfake face generation
pipeline. The extracted features are fed into an SVM classifier
to obtain the detection results. Experiments on two data sets
show the great performance of the proposed approach against
6its competing methods. The first data set, namely UADFV,
consists of 49 deep fake videos and their respective real videos
[93]. The second data set comprises 241 real images and 252
deep fake images, which is a subset of data used in the DARPA
MediFor GAN Image/Video Challenge [102]. Likewise, a
method to exploit artifacts of deepfakes and face manipulations
based on visual features of eyes, teeth and facial contours was
studied in [103]. The visual artifacts arise from lacking global
consistency, wrong or imprecise estimation of the incident
illumination, or imprecise estimation of the underlying geom-
etry. For deepfakes detection, missing reflections and missing
details in the eye and teeth areas are exploited as well as
texture features extracted from the facial region based on facial
landmarks. Accordingly, the eye feature vector, teeth feature
vector and features extracted from the full-face crop are used.
After extracting the features, two classifiers including logistic
regression and small neural network are employed to classify
the deepfakes from real videos. Experiments carried out on a
video data set downloaded from YouTube show the best result
of 0.851 in terms of the area under the receiver operating
characteristics curve. The proposed method however has a
disadvantage that requires images meeting certain prerequisite
such as open eyes or visual teeth.
The use of photo response non uniformity (PRNU) analysis
was proposed in [104] to detect deepfakes from authentic
ones. PRNU is a component of sensor pattern noise, which is
attributed to the manufacturing imperfection of silicon wafers
and the inconsistent sensitivity of pixels to light because of
the variation of the physical characteristics of the silicon
wafers. When a photo is taken, the sensor imperfection is
introduced into the high-frequency bands of the content in
the form of invisible noise. Because the imperfection is not
uniform across the silicon wafer, even sensors made from
the silicon wafer produce unique PRNU. Therefore, PRNU
is often considered as the fingerprint of digital cameras left
in the images by the cameras [105], [106]. The analysis is
widely used in image forensics [107]–[110] and advocated to
use in [104] because the swapped face is supposed to alter
the local PRNU pattern in the facial area of video frames.
The videos are converted into frames, which are cropped to
the questioned facial region. The cropped frames are then
separated sequentially into eight groups where an average
PRNU pattern is computed for each group. Normalised cross
correlation scores are calculated for comparisons of PRNU
patterns among these groups. The authors in [104] created
a test data set consisting of 10 authentic videos and 16
manipulated videos, where the fake videos were produced
from the genuine ones by the DeepFaceLab tool [31]. The
analysis shows a significant statistical difference in terms of
mean normalised cross correlation scores between deepfakes
and the genuine. This analysis therefore suggests that PRNU
has a potential in deepfake detection although a larger data set
would need to be tested.
When seeing a video or image with suspicion, users nor-
mally want to search for its origin. However, there is currently
no feasibility for such a tool. Hasan and Salah [111] proposed
the use of blockchain and smart contracts to help users detect
deepfake videos based on the assumption that videos are only
real when their sources are traceable. Each video is associated
with a smart contract that links to its parent video and each
parent video has a link to its child in a hierarchical structure.
Through this chain, users can credibly trace back to the orig-
inal smart contract associated with pristine video even if the
video has been copied multiple times. An important attribute of
the smart contract is the unique hashes of the interplanetary file
system (IPFS), which is used to store video and its metadata
in a decentralized and content-addressable manner [112]. The
smart contract’s key features and functionalities are tested
against several common security challenges such as distributed
denial of services, replay and man in the middle attacks to
ensure the proposed solution meeting security requirements.
This approach is generic, and it can be extended to other types
of digital content such as images, audios and manuscripts.
IV. DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE
RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Deepfakes have begun to erode trust of people in media
contents as seeing them is no longer commensurate with
believing in them. They could cause distress and negative
effects to those targeted, heighten disinformation and hate
speech, and even could stimulate political tension, inflame the
public, violence or war. This is especially critical nowadays
as the technologies for creating deepfakes are increasingly
approachable and social media platforms can spread those
fake contents quickly. Sometimes deepfakes do not need to be
spread to massive audience to cause detrimental effects. People
who create deepfakes with malicious purpose only need to de-
liver them to target audiences as part of their sabotage strategy
without using social media. For example, this approach can be
utilized by intelligence services trying to influence decisions
made by important people such as politicians, leading to
national and international security threats [113]. Catching the
deepfake alarming problem, research community has focused
on developing deepfake detection algorithms and numerous
results have been reported. This paper has reviewed the state-
of-the-art methods and a summary of typical approaches is
provided in Table II. It is noticeable that a battle between
those who use advanced machine learning to create deepfakes
with those who make effort to detect deepfakes is growing.
Deepfakes’ quality has been increasing and the performance
of detection methods needs to be improved accordingly. The
inspiration is that what AI has broken can be fixed by AI as
well [114]. Detection methods are still in their early stage and
various methods have been proposed and evaluated but using
fragmented data sets. An approach to improve performance of
detection methods is to create a growing updated benchmark
data set of deepfakes to validate the ongoing development
of detection methods. This will facilitate the training process
of detection models, especially those based on deep learning,
which requires a large training set [115].
On the other hand, current detection methods mostly focus
on drawbacks of the deepfake generation pipelines, i.e. finding
weakness of the competitors to attack them. This kind of
information and knowledge is not always available in adver-
sarial environments where attackers commonly attempt not to
7reveal such deepfake creation technologies. Recent works on
adversarial perturbation attacks to fool DNN-based detectors
make the deepfake detection task more difficult [116]–[120].
These are real challenges for detection method development
and a future research needs to focus on introducing more
robust, scalable and generalizable methods.
Another research direction is to integrate detection methods
into distribution platforms such as social media to increase its
effectiveness in dealing with the widespread impact of deep-
fakes. The screening or filtering mechanism using effective
detection methods can be implemented on these platforms to
ease the deepfakes detection [113]. Legal requirements can
be made for tech companies who own these platforms to
remove deepfakes quickly to reduce its impacts. In addition,
watermarking tools can also be integrated into devices that
people use to make digital contents to create immutable
metadata for storing originality details such as time and
location of multimedia contents as well as their untampered
attestment [113]. This integration is difficult to implement but
a solution for this could be the use of the disruptive blockchain
technology. The blockchain has been used effectively in many
areas and there are very few studies so far addressing the
deepfake detection problems based on this technology. As it
can create a chain of unique unchangeable blocks of metadata,
it is a great tool for digital provenance solution. The integration
of blockchain technologies to this problem has demonstrated
certain results [111] but this research direction is far from
mature.
Using detection methods to spot deepfakes is crucial, but
understanding the real intent of people publishing deepfakes
is even more important. This requires the judgement of users
based on social context in which deepfake is discovered, e.g.
who distributed it and what they said about it [121]. This is
critical as deepfakes are getting more and more photorealistic
and it is highly anticipated that detection software will be
lagging behind deepfake creation technology. A study on
social context of deepfakes to assist users in such judgement
is thus worth performing.
Videos and photographics have been widely used as ev-
idences in police investigation and justice cases. They may
be introduced as evidences in a court of law by digital
media forensics experts who have background in computer or
law enforcement and experience in collecting, examining and
analysing digital information. The development of machine
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF PROMINENT DEEPFAKE DETECTION METHODS
Methods Classifiers/
Techniques
Key Features Dealing
with
Data Sets Used
Eye blinking [88] LRCN - Use LRCN to learn the temporal patterns of eye blinking.
- Based on the observation that blinking frequency of
deepfakes is much smaller than normal.
Videos Consist of 49 interview and presentation videos, and their
corresponding generated deepfakes.
Using spatio-
temporal features
[84]
RCN Temporal discrepancies across frames are explored using
RCN that integrates convolutional network DenseNet [68]
and the gated recurrent unit cells [85]
Videos FaceForensics++ data set, including 1,000 videos [86].
Intra-frame
and temporal
inconsistencies
[87]
CNN and
LSTM
CNN is employed to extract frame-level features, which
are distributed to LSTM to construct sequence descriptor
useful for classification.
Videos A collection of 600 videos obtained from multiple web-
sites.
Using face warp-
ing artifacts [92]
VGG16 [90]
ResNet50,
101 or 152 [91]
Artifacts are discovered using CNN models based on
resolution inconsistency between the warped face area and
the surrounding context.
Videos - UADFV [93], containing 49 real videos and 49 fake
videos with 32752 frames in total.
- DeepfakeTIMIT [52]
MesoNet [83] CNN - Two deep networks, i.e. Meso-4 and MesoInception-4 are
introduced to examine deepfake videos at the mesoscopic
analysis level.
- Accuracy obtained on deepfake and FaceForensics data
sets are 98
Videos Two data sets: deepfake one constituted from online videos
and the FaceForensics one created by the Face2Face
approach [100].
Capsule-forensics
[95]
Capsule
networks
- Latent features extracted by VGG-19 network [90] are
fed into the capsule network for classification.
- A dynamic routing algorithm [97] is used to route
the outputs of three convolutional capsules to two output
capsules, one for fake and another for real images, through
a number of iterations.
Videos/
Images
Four data sets: the Idiap Research Institute replay-attack
[98], deepfake face swapping by [83], facial reenactment
FaceForensics [99], and fully computer-generated image
set using [101].
Head poses [93] SVM - Features are extracted using 68 landmarks of the face
region.
- Use SVM to classify using the extracted features.
Videos/
Images
- UADFV consists of 49 deep fake videos and their
respective real videos.
- 241 real images and 252 deep fake images from DARPA
MediFor GAN Image/Video Challenge.
Eye, teach and fa-
cial texture [103]
Logistic regres-
sion and neural
network
- Exploit facial texture differences, and missing reflections
and details in eye and teeth areas of deepfakes.
- Logistic regression and neural network are used for
classifying.
Videos A video data set downloaded from YouTube.
PRNU Analysis
[104]
PRNU - Analysis of noise patterns of light sensitive sensors of
digital cameras due to their factory defects.
- Explore the differences of PRNU patterns between the
authentic and deepfake videos because face swapping is
believed to alter the local PRNU patterns.
Videos Created by the authors, including 10 authentic and 16
deepfake videos using DeepFaceLab [31].
Using phoneme-
viseme
mismatches
[122]
CNN - Exploit the mismatches between the dynamics of the
mouth shape, i.e. visemes, with a spoken phoneme.
- Focus on sounds associated with the M, B and P
phonemes as they require complete mouth closure while
deepfakes often incorrectly synthesize it.
Videos Four in-the-wild lip-sync deepfakes from Instagram
and YouTube (www.instagram.com/bill posters uk and
youtu.be/VWMEDacz3L4) and others are created using
synthesis techniques, i.e. Audio-to-Video (A2V) [51] and
Text-to-Video (T2V) [123].
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Techniques
Key Features Dealing
with
Data Sets Used
Using attribution-
based confidence
(ABC) metric
[124]
ResNet50
model [91],
pre-trained on
VGGFace2
[125]
- The ABC metric [126] is used to detect deepfake videos
without accessing to training data.
- ABC values obtained for original videos are greater than
0.94 while those of deepfakes have low ABC values.
Videos VidTIMIT and two other original datasets obtained from
the COHFACE (https://www.idiap.ch/dataset/cohface) and
from YouTube. Datasets from COHFACE [127] and
YouTube are used to generate two deepfake datasets by
commercial website https://deepfakesweb.com and another
deepfake dataset is DeepfakeTIMIT [128].
Using spatial
and temporal
signatures [129]
Convolutional
bidirectional
recurrent LSTM
network
- An XceptionNet CNN is used for facial feature extraction
while audio embeddings are obtained by stacking multiple
convolution modules.
- Two loss functions, i.e. cross-entropy and Kullback-
Leibler divergence, are used.
Videos FaceForensics++ [86] and Celeb-DF (5,639 deepfake
videos) [130] datasets and the ASVSpoof 2019 Logical
Access audio dataset [131].
Using emotion
audio-visual
affective cues
[132]
Siamese
network
architecture
[67]
Modality and emotion embedding vectors for the face and
speech are extracted for deepfake detection.
Videos DeepfakeTIMIT [128] and DFDC [133].
Using appearance
and behaviour
[134]
Rules defined
based on facial
and behavioural
features.
Temporal, behavioral biometric based on facial expres-
sions and head movements are learned using ResNet-101
[91] while static facial biometric is obtained using VGG
[48].
Videos The world leaders dataset [135], FaceForensics++ [86],
Google/Jigsaw deepfake detection dataset [136], DFDC
[133] and Celeb-DF [130].
Preprocessing
combined with
deep network
[60]
DCGAN,
WGAN-GP and
PGGAN.
- Enhance generalization ability of models to detect GAN
generated images.
- Remove low level features of fake images.
- Force deep networks to focus more on pixel level similar-
ity between fake and real images to improve generalization
ability.
Images - Real data set: CelebA-HQ [74], including high quality
face images of 1024x1024 resolution.
- Fake data sets: generated by DCGAN [70], WGAN-GP
[72] and PGGAN [74].
Bag of words and
shallow classifiers
[56]
SVM, RF, MLP Extract discriminant features using bag of words method
and feed these features into SVM, RF and MLP for binary
classification: innocent vs fabricated.
Images The well-known LFW face database [137], containing
13,223 images with resolution of 250x250.
Pairwise learning
[66]
CNN
concatenated to
CFFN
Two-phase procedure: feature extraction using CFFN
based on the Siamese network architecture [67] and clas-
sification using CNN.
Images - Face images: real ones from CelebA [69], and fake
ones generated by DCGAN [70], WGAN [71], WGAN-
GP [72], least squares GAN [73], and PGGAN [74].
- General images: real ones from ILSVRC12 [75], and fake
ones generated by BIGGAN [76], self-attention GAN [77]
and spectral normalization GAN [78].
Defenses against
adversarial
perturbations
introduced to
deepfakes [116]
VGG [48] and
ResNet [91]
- Introduce adversarial perturbations to enhance deepfakes
and fool deepfake detectors.
- Improve accuracy of deepfake detectors using Lipschitz
regularization and deep image prior techniques.
Images 5,000 real images from CelebA [69] and 5,000 fake images
created by the Few-Shot Face Translation GAN method
[138].
Analyzing
convolutional
traces [139]
K-nearest
neighbors,
SVM, and linear
discriminant
analysis
Using expectation maximization algorithm to extract local
features pertaining to convolutional generative process of
GAN-based image deepfake generators.
Images Authentic images from CelebA and corresponding deep-
fakes are created by five different GANs (group-wise deep
whitening-and-coloring transformation GDWCT [140],
StarGAN [141], AttGAN [142], StyleGAN [143], Style-
GAN2 [144]).
learning and AI technologies might have been used to modify
these digital contents and thus the experts’ opinions may not be
enough to authenticate these evidences because even experts
are unable to discern manipulated contents. This aspect needs
to take into account in courtrooms nowadays when images and
videos are used as evidences to convict perpetrators because
of the existence of a wide range of digital manipulation
methods [145]. The digital media forensics results therefore
must be proved to be valid and reliable before they can be
used in courts. This requires careful documentation for each
step of the forensics process and how the results are reached.
Machine learning and AI algorithms can be used to support
the determination of the authenticity of digital media and have
obtained accurate and reliable results, e.g. [146]–[148], but
most of these algorithms are unexplainable. This creates a huge
hurdle for the applications of AI in forensics problems because
not only the forensics experts oftentimes do not have expertise
in computer algorithms, but the computer professionals also
cannot explain the results properly as most of these algorithms
are black box models [149]. This is more critical as the most
recent models with the most accurate results are based on
deep learning methods consisting of many neural network
parameters. Explainable AI in computer vision therefore is
a research direction that is needed to promote and utilize the
advances and advantages of AI and machine learning in digital
media forensics.
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